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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce a framework for measuring un-
linkability both per subject and for an entire system. The framework
enables the evaluator to attach different sensitivities to individual items
in the system, and to specify the severity of different types of error that
an adversary can make. These parameters, as well as a threshold that
defines what constitutes a privacy breach, may be varied for each subject
in the system; the framework respects and combines these potentially dif-
fering parametrisations. It also makes use of graphs in a way that results
in intuitive feedback of different levels of detail. We exhibit the behaviour
of our measures in two experimental settings, namely that of adversaries
that output randomly chosen partitions, and that of adversaries that
launch attacks of different effectiveness.
1 Introduction
An adversary on unlinkability aims to divide a given set of elements into
non-overlapping clusters, such that the elements in each cluster belong
to the same subject or, more generally, share a well-defined property. In
the electronic world, such elements are typically digital data items that
arise as a result of online transactions, e.g. personal messages, shopping
records, user attributes, protocol transcripts, or entries in an audit log.
Measuring linkability is important because an adversary’s ability to link
elements that should be unlinkable constitutes a privacy breach. More-
over, successful attacks on linkability can lead to further privacy breaches
such as the unauthorised (re-)identification of subjects [13]. We stress,
however, that an adversary on unlinkability does not necessarily care
about identifying subjects.
Linkability measurements are not straightforward. Consider, for ex-
ample, the partition Π = {{◦, ◦, ◦, ◦, ◦}, {•, •}}, and let us call its two
clusters ‘Alice’s and Bob’s items’. An adversary assuming that the correct
partition is {{◦, ◦, ◦, ◦, ◦}, {•}, {•}}, obviously failed to link Bob’s items,
but has linked Alice’s items perfectly. It is, however, not obvious which of
the partitions,Π ′1 = {{◦, ◦, ◦, ◦}, {◦, •, •}},Π ′2 = {{◦, ◦, ◦, •}, {◦, ◦}, {•}},
and Π ′3 = {{◦, ◦, ◦}, {◦}, {◦}, {•, •}}, for example, is a better approxima-
tion of Π, both overall and with respect to any given subject. In order
to demonstrate this, we first focus on Alice’s items but ignore, for the
moment, Bob’s. According to Π ′1, almost all her items have been identi-
fied as belonging together, with the exception of one, which belongs to a
different cluster. Π ′2 also divides Alice’s items into two clusters, but the
second one contains two items rather than only one. Intuition therefore
suggests that Π ′2 is a worse approximation than Π ′1, at least with respect
to Alice’s items. Π ′3 divides Alice’s items into three clusters. However,
one has to re-allocate the same amount of items (two) in both Π ′2 and
Π ′3 to completely link Alice’s items. This, however, does not necessarily
mean that both clusters are equally good approximations; Π ′3 may still
be considered worse than Π ′2 since, in Π ′2, a single cluster merging suffices
to completely link Alice’s items, while, in Π ′3, two such mergings are re-
quired. We now stop ignoring Bob’s items, but still focus on unlinkability
from Alice’s point of view. While Π ′1 contains a cluster that mixes two
of Bob’s items with some of Alice’s, Π ′2 mixes only one. Moreover, Π ′3
contains no cluster that mixes items of both Alice and Bob. This second
viewpoint leads to opposite conclusions: Π ′3 is a better approximation of
Π than Π ′2, and Π ′2 is better than Π ′1.
In order to decide which of the two viewpoints should prevail, it is
important to know more about the concrete context. A loan seeker, for
example, would like to prevent his bank from being able to link his neg-
ative credit ratings, but if linking happens anyway, then he is likely to
prefer correct rather than incorrect inferences to be made.1 A consumer,
on the other hand, would like to prevent the direct marketing company
from being able to aggregate his shopping behaviour into a detailed pro-
file, but if this happens anyway, he is likely to prefer his profile to be
‘contaminated’ with the shopping histories of other people. Both the loan
seeker and the consumer are therefore interested in both viewpoints, but
have different preferred outcomes with respect to the latter viewpoint.
In this paper, we develop a novel evaluation framework for adversarial
partitions that enables one to take these different viewpoints. The frame-
work is flexible in multiple ways, as it enables the evaluator to attach
different sensitivities to individual items in the system, to specify the
severity of different types of error that an adversary can make, and to
define a threshold that defines what constitutes a privacy breach. These
1 We assume that the loan seeker is willing to pay back his own debts in order to erase
negative credit ratings if necessary, but unwilling to do so for other people’s debts.
parametrisations may vary for each subject in the system; the framework
respects and combines them. Evaluations are communicated by means of
intuitive graphs and, since they are performed on the subject level, can
serve as the basis for further analysis such as fairness.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. The next section sur-
veys related work, and section 3 introduces our evaluation framework.
Section 4 illustrates its application on a toy example. Section 5 compares
the behaviour of our measures to that of other distance measures. Finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Related work
Two research areas relate to our work, namely that of privacy and that
of statistical classification. In particular, we build on ideas on measuring
unlinkability from the former, and comparing clusterings from the latter
area. Works from the first area deal with the question of how effectively
certain privacy preserving systems protect the unlinkability of the ele-
ments that arise in the system. While [3, 4, 9, 11], for example, measure
unlinkability in general, [13, 14] and [1] do so in the context of anonymous
communication and attribute sharing, respectively. In addition, [11] con-
siders fairness.
The literature on comparing clusterings, on the other hand, has a
longer history, and many distance metrics on partitions have been de-
fined and used over the years [5, 15]. The Rand index [12], for example,
considers the extent to which two partitions treat all element pairs simi-
larly, the minimum transfer distance [2] considers the number of element
transfers until two partitions are identical and the variation of informa-
tion [7] uses information-theoretic primitives.
The overall goal of both research areas is to provide the basis to com-
pare partitions. The difference is that, in the ‘measuring unlinkability’
area, these partitions represent attacks on specific privacy preserving sys-
tems, while, in the ‘comparing clusterings’ context, they represent algo-
rithms that aim to classify the items of a given dataset in some useful way.
Unfortunately, the approaches from both areas suffer from certain inflexi-
bilities that limit their suitability when it comes to evaluating adversarial
partitions in a privacy setting. These inflexibilities manifest themselves
in three different ways, as follows.
Firstly, existing approaches do not take into account important as-
pects of adversarial partitions. While [14], for example, mainly focuses
on the question of whether or not two given elements are linked, [3, 9] as
well as the literature on comparing clusterings, compute measurements
over a given partition as a whole. Both approaches do not measure un-
linkability on the crucial subject level. Other works, e.g. [4, 11, 14], also
consider the (degree of) unlinkability of arbitrary element subsets; their
focus is, however, on the extent to which the elements of the subset can
be linked, while the extent to which foreign elements (i.e. elements not
in the subset) ‘contaminate’ the adversary’s view on the subset, are dis-
regarded. (Here it should be mentioned that this is not entirely true for
the ‘white-box’ analysis approach described in [3]; depending on the cho-
sen partition distance metric, contamination levels may be taken into
account. This, however, does not happen on the subject level, but rather
on the overall partition level.) In this work, we ask the question ‘how well
is a given solution cluster hidden within the adversarial partition?’. That
is, we perform separate measurements pertaining to each subject without
ignoring foreign elements (i.e. elements belonging to other subjects), and,
if necessary, combine these into an overall average only in the last step.
This approach yields not only measurements on the subject level, but also
natural ways to evaluate the fairness provided by the underlying system.
Secondly, existing approaches do not distinguish between the sensi-
tivity that users or evaluators attach to the elements in a system. They
also do not let the evaluator specify his sensitivity towards different types
of error that an adversarial partition may exhibit. That is, existing ap-
proaches do not account for the fact that the same adversarial partition
may represent attacks of different seriousness in different contexts. Our
evaluation framework enables the evaluator to formulate such sensitivi-
ties.
Thirdly, it is unclear how to construct supportive material, such as
illustrations or graphics, that show, in a sufficiently intuitive way, how a
given (un)linkability measurement comes about. While the graphs that
represent an attacker’s internal state as defined in [9] are certainly an ex-
ception, they do not convey the information of how well a given subject’s
cluster is hidden within the adversary’s state (especially in the presence
of ‘transitivity contradictions’). Our evaluation framework uses graphs
that depict meaningful quantities that individual subjects are likely to
care about. In fact, in our framework, these graphs do not depict the fi-
nal unlinkability measurements. Rather conversely, the final unlinkability
measurements are derived from the graphs.
Our approach remains agnostic to specific applications, and combines
ideas from both research areas above. From the literature of measuring
unlinkability we follow the idea that unlinkability generally decreases as
the adversary links more of a given subject’s elements, and we take into ac-
count adversaries that output multiple, in their view probable partitions.
From the literature on comparing clusterings, we adopt some (very) basic
notions of [7]. Namely, the intersection of cluster pairs is an important
quantity that defines, among other parameters, both ‘miss’ and ‘include’
error counts in our approach. These same intersections also play a cen-
tral role in the ‘variation of information’ metric (see Equation 15 in [7]).
However, it is not our goal to define distance metrics in the strict sense;
therefore our framework does not aim to fulfill the axioms put forth in [8].
It does, however, fulfill the informal criteria listed in [3], namely taking
into account both the certainty and the consistency of the adversary.
3 Evaluating adversarial partitions
Our evaluation methodology focuses on the errors made by an adversary,
and distinguishes between primary and secondary errors. The motivation
for this distinction lies in the ‘sort of story’ that the two error types tell:
primary errors describe the adversary’s current state, while secondary
errors describe the risk that this state represents for the future. More
precisely, primary errors describe how well a given solution cluster is cur-
rently hidden within a given adversarial partition, while secondary errors
describe how well the cluster remains hidden if additional information
would enable the adversary to further refine its current assessment. In
the following, Π denotes the solution partition, and Π ′ the adversarial
partition. We assume that both Π and Π ′ are set partitions of the same
finite set of size n =
∑
C∈Π |C| and use the notation C and C ′ to refer to
individual clusters of Π and Π ′, respectively.
3.1 Primary errors
Motivated by the example in the introduction, we consider two types
of primary error that an adversary can make with respect to a solution
cluster: a ‘miss’ error occurs if the adversary fails to include an element
that should be included in the cluster, and an ‘include’ error occurs if it
includes an element that should not have been included. Formally, given
a cluster pair C,C ′, the number of miss and include errors is defined
as m(C,C ′) = |C − C ′| and i(C,C ′) = |C ′ − C|, respectively. The miss
(resp. include) error counts can also be defined asm(C,C ′) = |C|−|C∩C ′|
(resp. i(C,C ′) = |C ′| − |C ∩ C ′|). This makes explicit the intersection
mentioned in section 2.
The evaluator may be more sensitive towards miss than he is towards
include errors, or vice versa. We let the evaluator indicate this sensitivity
by means of a ‘policy parameter’ α ∈ [0, 1]: setting α = 0 indicates that
he cares exclusively about the extent to which the elements of interest are
linked, while completely ignoring foreign elements. Setting α = 1, on the
other hand, means that the evaluator is agnostic to the extent to which
the adversary has managed to link the elements, and is only interested
in the extent to which foreign elements are being mixed together with
the correct ones. If both error types are to be deemed equally important,
then the evaluator has to set α = 1/2.
We are interested to count errors per subject, i.e. per solution cluster.
One approach would be, given a solution cluster, to average the error
counts over all adversarial clusters. However, since only few adversarial
clusters are likely to be related to any given solution cluster C, we do not
follow this approach. Instead we use only the most relevant adversarial
cluster as the basis to count primary errors. This cluster is one of the
adversarial clusters that have at least one element in common with C,
and we use the policy parameter α to identify which one it is. We pro-
ceed as follows. Given C, we first determine the subset of related clusters
L(C,Π ′) = {C ′ ∈ Π ′ : |C ∩ C ′| ≥ 1}. Then, we calculate the priority for
each cluster in L(C,Π ′) as pα(C,C ′) = (αm(C,C ′) + (1− α)i(C,C ′))−1.
The most relevant adversarial cluster is the one with the highest priority.
If two or more related adversarial clusters yield this maximum, then
we take the average of their error counts. The complete formal proce-
dure is therefore as follows. Given a solution cluster C, we first deter-
mine the set of most relevant adversarial clusters as Rα(C,Π ′) = {C ′ ∈
L(C,Π ′) : pα(C,C ′) = maxC′∈L(C,Π′) pα(C,C ′)}. Then the error counts
for solution cluster C with respect to an adversarial partition Π ′ are
given by m(C,Π ′, α) =
∑
C′∈Rα(C,Π′) m(C,C
′)/|Rα(C,Π′)| and i(C,Π ′, α) =∑
C′∈Rα(C,Π′) i(C,C
′)/|Rα(C,Π′)|. Finally, the total error counts are obtained
simply by adding up the per solution cluster counts: m(Π,Π ′, α) =∑
C∈Π m(C,Π
′, α) and i(Π,Π ′, α) =
∑
C∈Π i(C,Π
′, α).
Remark 1. If m(Π,Π ′, α) > i(Π,Π ′, α), then we call Π ′ ‘conservative’, if
m(Π,Π ′, α) < i(Π,Π ′, α) then we call it ‘liberal’, and ‘neutral’ in case of
equality. If α = 0 (resp. α = 1), then the evaluator prefers conservative
rather than liberal (resp. liberal rather than conservative) adversarial
partitions. Consider an adversary thinking that, by default, all elements
are unlinked (resp. linked), and links (resp. unlinks) elements only if it
observes strong evidence in support of this. Roughly speaking, in the
presence of uncertainty, such an adversary is likely to make more miss
(resp. include) rather than include (resp. miss) errors, and thus end up
with a conservative (resp. liberal) partition.
Remark 2. Note that m(Π,Π ′, α) and i(Π,Π ′, α) as well as their sum
can be seen as distance measures between the two partitions. One should
keep in mind, however, that they are asymmetric. If, for example, Π =
{{◦, •,}} and Π ′ = {{◦, •}, {}}, then m(Π,Π ′, 1/2) = 1 but m(Π ′,Π,
1/2) = 0, and i(Π,Π ′, 1/2) = 0 but i(Π ′,Π, 1/2) = 3. We do not consider
this asymmetry to be a problem because we do not aim to specify a real
distance metric over the partition space. It is nevertheless important that
our measures behave consistently with real distance metrics; see section 5
for an examination in this respect.
Combining and normalising primary errors For a given policy pa-
rameter α and solution cluster C, the combined error count with respect
to an adversarial partition Π ′ is defined by e(C,Π ′, α) = αm(C,Π ′, α) +
(1 − α)i(C,Π ′, α). In order to normalise this combined error count, we
consider the worst case, i.e. the adversarial partition that maximises it.
Assuming that n ≥ 2, the worst case occurs if α = 0, |C| = 1 and Π ′ is a
singleton: in this case, there occur m(C,Π ′, α) = |C| − 1 = 0 miss errors
and i(C,Π) = n − |C| = n − 1 include errors, and, thus, n − 1 errors in
total. We therefore define the normalised error count of Π ′ with respect
to C as e∗(C,Π ′, α) = e(C,Π′,α)/n−1. Note that 0 ≤ e∗(C,Π ′, α) ≤ 1; it is
zero if the adversary has made no errors that the evaluator cares about,
and one in the worst case just described. Also note that normalisation is
possible only if n ≥ 2. The overall normalised error count is the average
e∗(Π,Π ′, α) =
∑
C∈Π e
∗(C,Π′,α)/|Π|.
3.2 Secondary errors
If an adversarial partition contains many more clusters than the solution
partition, then primary error counts are bound to give an incomplete
picture, because they ignore the exact structure of all but the most rel-
evant clusters. We are thus interested in more detailed evaluation, and,
in particular, in the number of mergings that are required until a given
percentage of elements of a particular solution cluster have been linked
in the adversarial partition. The smaller the number of required merg-
ings, the better the partition. However, every merging potentially brings
with it foreign elements, and the sensitivity towards the presence of such
elements is a matter of the evaluator’s policy.
Moreover, we must decide in which order the mergings are performed
until the target percentage is reached. Our Plot algorithm, shown in
Fig. 1, makes use of the evaluator’s policy parameter in order to establish
this ordering. Given a solution cluster C, the adversarial partition Π ′,
the policy parameter α, and a bit b that indicates whether or not con-
tamination is desirable from the subject’s point of view (if b = 1 then
contamination is desirable)2, the algorithm produces a plot of two graphs
that communicates the quality of the adversarial partition with respect to
C in an intuitive way. The linked graph, in particular, shows how quickly
consecutive mergings lead to element linking, and the mixed graph shows
how quickly foreign elements are mixed into the cluster as a result of the
same mergings. The worst-case complexity of our implementation of the
PlotForCluster algorithm is O(n2).
PlotForCluster (input: C,Π ′, α, b)
1. For all C′ ∈ L(C,Π ′), compute the priority pα(C,C′). Then order L(C,Π ′)
according to the priority, highest value first. Resolve ties by giving priority
to clusters with fewer foreign elements. Resolve remaining ties arbitrarily.
2. Start with an empty cluster X.
3. For values of j = 1 until |L(C,Π ′)|, do the following.
(a) Merge X with the jth cluster from L(C,Π ′).
(b) Plot the data point (j − 1, 1− (m(C,X)/|C|) in the ‘linked’ graph.
(c) If |C| = n, set y = 0. Otherwise set y = i(C,X)/n−|C|.
(d) If b = 0 (resp. b = 1), plot the data point (j − 1, y) (resp. (j − 1, 1− y))
in the ‘mixed’ graph.
Fig. 1: Plotting the ‘linked’ and ‘mixed’ graphs for a given solution cluster
Based on these plots, we can measure how ‘dangerously’ the adver-
sarial partition approaches any given threshold β ∈ [0, 1], where β repre-
sents a percentage of to-be-linked elements of a given solution cluster C.
This is done as follows. First, we let yλ,C,Π′(x) (resp. yµ,C,Π′(x)) denote
the y-coordinate of the data point at x in that cluster’s linked (resp.
mixed) graph. If β ≤ yλ,C,Π′(0), then the threshold β has already been
surpassed by the partition Π ′; no mergings are required to reach β. If
β > yλ,C,Π′(0), on the other hand, then we proceed as follows. First, we
draw a horizontal line starting at the point (0, β). Using this line, we find
the point (xλ,C,β, yλ,C,β) of the linked graph that corresponds to β. From
there, we draw a vertical line and find the point (xµ,C,β , yµ,C,β) where this
line meets the mixed graph. We call the vectors that start at the origin
and point to (xλ,C,β, yλ,C,β) and (xµ,C,β , yµ,C,β), the ‘β-linked’ and the ‘β-
mixed’ vectors, respectively. The slope of the β-linked vector, expressed
2 The loan seeker (resp. consumer) from the introduction would set b = 0 (resp. b = 1).
as a percentage, is then used as a measure of how quickly the adversarial
partition approaches the threshold.
Combining and normalising secondary errors Unless α = 0, the
slope of the β-linked vector must be co-evaluated with the slope of the
β-mixed vector, because the latter expresses how quickly foreign ele-
ments ‘contaminate’ the adversarial cluster as it approaches the given
threshold. We again use the policy parameter α in order to combine
the two slopes into a single measurement: the risk slope of a given so-
lution cluster C with respect to an adversarial partition Π ′, a threshold
β > yλ,C,Π′(0), and policy parameter α is defined as ∆(C,Π ′, β, α) =
2/pi[α arctan(yλ,C,β/xλ,C,β)+ (1−α) arctan(yµ,C,β/xµ,C,β)]. Note that 0 ≤
∆(C,Π ′, β, α) ≤ 1.
Evaluating the entire partition The above computations and graphs
measure the extent to which a given solution cluster is hidden within
an adversarial partition. We would like to plot a single graph that sum-
marises the situation for the entire solution partition and that somehow
conveys the extent to which ‘the typical’ solution cluster is hidden in
the solution partition. Unfortunately, taking the straight-forward aver-
age |Π|−1∑C∈Π ∆(C,Π ′, β, α) is not an option, because the values of
yλ,C,Π′(0) are likely to differ for each C and this forces this expression to
remain undefined for all β ≤ maxC∈Π yλ,C,Π′(0).
We circumvent this problem by plotting the ‘overall’ linked and mixed
graphs using the PlotForPartition algorithm shown in Fig. 2. Note
that, in order to make the algorithm work, the quantities yλ,C,Π′(x) and
yµ,C,Π′(x) for values of x between |L(C,Π ′)| and |Π|− 1 (inclusive) must
first be defined; recall that, since both graphs in the plot for cluster C have
exactly |L(C,Π ′)| data points (one representing the adversary’s current
state, and one for every merging until the adversary has linked all ele-
ments in C), these quantities were defined above only for x < |L(C,Π ′)|.
We use the following recursive flat definitions to define yλ,C,Π′(x) and
yµ,C,Π′(x) for the missing range: for all x ≥ |L(C,Π ′)|, yλ,C,Π′(x) def=
yλ,C,Π′(|L(C,Π ′)| − 1) = 1 and yµ,C,Π′(x) def= yµ,C,Π′(|L(C,Π ′)| − 1). If,
for example, a plot does not contain a data point for the third merging
because the adversary can fully link the elements of the cluster in, say, two
mergings – |L(C,Π ′)| = 3 in this case – , then we take into account the
situation after the final (i.e. second) merging. That is, the y-coordinates
of all data points for three or more mergings, are defined to be identical
to the y-coordinates of the data points at the second merging. For the
linked graph, these coordinates are always 1 (since it is the final merging).
For the mixed graph, they are equal to the percentage of foreign elements
that were present after the final merging.
Given this definition, the linked (resp. mixed) graph produced by
PlotForPartition represents the average percentage of elements, over
all subjects, that are linked (resp. mixed) after the adversary is given
an allowance of performing up to x cluster mergings. Armed with these
graphs, the risk slope ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) representing the ‘average solution
cluster’ for a given threshold β can be computed in the same manner
as ∆(C,Π ′, β, α). The worst-case complexity of our implementation of
PlotForPartition is O(n3)
PlotForPartition (input: Π,Π ′, α)
1. Run PlotForCluster for all clusters C ∈ Π.
2. For values of j = 0 until |Π| − 1, do the following.
(a) Compute the averages yˆl =
P
C∈Π yλ,C,Π′ (j)
|Π| and yˆm =
P
C∈Π yµ,C,Π′ (j)
|Π| .
(b) Plot (j, yˆl) and (j, yˆm) in the ‘linked’ and ‘mixed’ graphs, respectively.
Fig. 2: Plotting the ‘linked’ and ‘mixed’ graphs for the entire partition
3.3 Sensitive elements
Merely counting errors presumes that all elements are equal. In reality,
however, often only little harm is done if an adversary links some elements,
as long as certain particularly sensitive ones remain unlinked. Similarly,
one may be not suffer much if an adversary links some (or all) of one’s
elements, as long as certain foreign elements, perhaps of a particularly
desirable type, are being mixed according to the adversary’s view. In
order to account for different element sensitivities, we enable the evaluator
to first attach a weight w` ∈ [0, 1] to each element `. The weights are
required to represent the relative sensitivity of the elements. We therefore
generalise the miss and error count formulas as m(C,C ′) =
∑
`∈{C−C′}w`
and i(C,C ′) =
∑
`∈{C′−C}w`; the remainder of our framework remains
unchanged.
Note that subjects may disagree as to which elements are more sen-
sitive than others. They may also disagree on the value that the policy
parameter α should have. This is not a problem in our framework; the
evaluator may assign both different sensitivities to the elements and dif-
ferent values to α and well as bfor each solution cluster evaluation. That
is, each cluster plot may have a different underlying sensitivities; since
step 2 of PlotForPartition does not take sensitivities into account, di-
vergent sensitivities cause no problem. On the contrary, they will cause
the overall plot to represent more accurately the summary of the risk as
perceived by each subject.
3.4 Adversarial views over partitions
So far we have assumed that the adversary outputs a single partition.
It may, however, output a probability distribution over the space of par-
titions. Note that a computationally bounded adversary can only out-
put a distribution that can be encoded in polynomial length. Without
loss of generality, we assume that an adversary outputs a view V =
{(Π ′1,Pr(Π ′1 = Π)), (Π ′2,Pr(Π ′2 = Π)), . . . } such that , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ |V|,
Pr(Π ′i = Π) > 0 and
∑
i Pr(Π
′
i = Π) = 1. The pair (Π
′
i,Pr(Π
′
i = Π))
means that, according to the adversary’s view, Π ′i is the correct partition
with probability Pr(Π ′i = Π).
Primary errors We define the average miss and include error counts
for solution cluster C with respect to a view V as
m(C,V, α) =
∑
((Π′,Pr(Π′=Π))∈V
Pr(Π ′ = Π)m(C,Π ′, α) and
i(C,V, α) =
∑
((Π′,Pr(Π′=Π))∈V
Pr(Π ′ = Π)i(C,Π ′, α),
respectively.3 These formulas then replace m(C,Π, α) and m(C,Π, α),
and the remainder of the primary error evaluation as described in sec-
tion 3.1 remains unchanged.
Secondary errors In order to plot the linked and mixed graphs for
a given solution cluster with respect to an adversarial view V, we use
the PlotForClusterGivenView algorithm shown in Fig. 3. This algo-
rithm is very similar in spirit with the PlotForPartition algorithm; the
difference is that the plotted values are not averages over clusters, but
rather weighted averages over the partitions in the view. Note that, as
expected, both PlotForCluster and PlotForClusterGivenView effec-
tively yield identical plots for adversaries that output a single partition.
3 These definitions follow the spirit of Equation 3 in [3], which also weighs a particular
partition-dependent quantity by the probability that the underlying partition is the
correct one.
Also note that the worst-case complexity ofPlotForClusterGivenView
is O(n2|V|). That is, the evaluation of sufficiently lengthy adversarial
views, i.e. such that |V|  n2, is roughly linear in their size.
PlotForClusterGivenView (input: C,V, α)
1. Run PlotForCluster(C,Π ′, α) for all Π ′ ∈ V.
2. For values of j = 0 until |Π ′| − 1, do the following.
(a) Compute the weighted averages yˆλ =
P
Π′∈V Pr(Π
′ = Π)yλ,C,Π′(j)
and yˆµ =
P
Π′∈V Pr(Π
′ = Π)yµ,C,Π′(j)
(b) Plot (j, yˆl) and (j, yˆm) in the ‘linked’ and ‘mixed’ graphs, respectively.
Fig. 3: Plotting the ‘linked’ and ‘mixed’ graphs of given solution cluster with respect
to an adversarial view over the partition space
4 Example
Consider a set of 24 items and the solution partition Π that divides it into
four clusters of equal size: triangles, squares, circles, and stars. Suppose
that two adversaries, which are asked to partition the set, come up with
the adversarial partitions shown in Fig. 4 (first row). Assuming that our
policy parameter is α = 1/2, the left partition Π ′1 is a conservative one, be-
cause it exhibits m(Π,Π ′1, α) = m(triangles,Π ′1, α)+m(squares,Π ′1, α)+
m(circles,Π ′1, α) +m(stars,Π ′1, α) = 4 + 2 + 3 + 3 = 12 miss errors, but
only i(Π,Π ′1, α) = 4 include errors. The right partition Π ′2 is a liberal
one: it exhibits m(Π,Π ′2, α) = 7 miss errors and i(Π,Π ′2, α) = 15 include
errors.
The star-star-circle cluster of Π ′1, for example, does not contribute
to the primary error counts at all. We therefore evaluate the partitions
with respect to secondary errors. The second row of Fig. 4 shows the
output of PlotForCluster for the star cluster, and with respect to the
two adversarial partitions Π ′1 (left) and Π ′2 (right). The left (resp. right)
side plot also shows the ‘linked’ and ‘mixed’ vectors corresponding to
the linkage of β = 90% (resp. β = 70%) of the stars. We have that
∆(Π,Π ′1, 0.9, 1/2) ≈ 1/2(0.364 + 0.100) ≈ 23.20% and ∆(Π,Π ′2, 0.7, 1/2) ≈
1/2(0.361 + 0.340) ≈ 35.03%.
The third row of Fig. 4 shows the output of PlotForPartition with
respect to the two adversarial partitions, for different values of the pa-
rameter α. Note that, for most parameter values, the linked and mixed
graphs coincide partially or entirely. Finally, the fourth row of Fig. 4
Fig. 4: First row: a conservative (left) and a liberal (right) adversarial partition. Second
row: linked and mixed graphs for the star cluster and with respect to the adversarial
partitions above (α = 1/2). Third row: overall linked and mixed graphs, with respect to
the adversarial partitions above, and for all α ∈ {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}. Fourth row: risk slopes
∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) of the plots in the third row, as a function of the threshold β, for all
α ∈ {0, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 1}. Contamination is assumed to be undesirable (i.e. b = 0).
shows the the risk slopes, i.e. the value of ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) as a function of
the threshold percentage β.
5 Simulated attacks
This section examines the behaviour of our risk slope measure. Our mo-
tivation is to demonstrate that it behaves intuitively when viewed as a
distance measure between partitions. We first take a brief look at its be-
haviour in the setting of uniformly at random chosen partitions. (For an
efficient way to choose partitions in this way, see chapter 10 of [10].) Due
to space constraints we only show results for the case where contami-
nation is undesirable, i.e. where b = 0. Figure 5 shows and constrasts
how three distance measures behave for uniformly at random chosen par-
titions as the number of elements n grows. The three measures shown
are ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) (for α = 1/3, 2/3 and β = 0.7, 0.8), the variation of
information (VOI) [7], and the minimal transfer distance (MTD) [2].
We observe that, similarly to the MTD and VOI, ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) be-
haves smoothly as n grows. This is important because a weak dependence
on n is preferable to a strong one (see section 5 of [7]). Moreover, while the
MTD and the VOI measures only depend on Π and Π ′, ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α)
varies depending on the sensitivities specified by the evaluator. The fig-
ure demonstrates that ∆(Π,Π ′, 0.7, α) > ∆(Π,Π ′, 0.8, α). This matches
our intuition that, since linking 70% of a subjet’s elements is generally
easier than linking 80%, the risk of this happening is higher, too. The
figure also shows that ∆(Π,Π ′, β, 2/3) > ∆(Π,Π ′, β, 1/3). This matches
our intution that, since uniformly at random chosen partitions tend to be
conservative (i.e. have many relatively small, rather than few very large
clusters), attaching more importance to the presence of foreign elements
results in lower risk levels. Finally, we observe that, as n grows, the MTD
increases while the other measures decrease. The reasons for this lie as
much with the measures themselves as with the nature of uniformly at
random chosen partitions and the applied normalisations. Due to space
constraints we do not analyse this further here. See appendix A for more
information on the behaviour of our measures in the setting of random
partitions.
Fig. 5: ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α), the variation of information normalised by log2(n) (see sec-
tion 5.1 of [7]), and the minimal transfer distance [2], normalised by n− 1. The shown
results are averages of 1000 experiment repetitions.
In order to demonstrate that the behaviour of ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) is con-
sistent and intuitive, we now compare it to the behaviour of the VOI
distance in more detail. While we could use any reasonable measure as
the basis for our comparison, we use the VOI because it has been shown
to be a true metric [7]. We generate data for the comparison as follows.
First, we choose a solution partitionΠ. Then we generate many partitions
Π ′ that have different distances from Π. These partitions are generated
by means of random walks of different lengths that start at Π and explore
the solution space from there. Finally, we plot the ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) distance
(vertical axis) against the VOI distance (horizontal axis) between Π and
each Π ′. Since the partitions Π ′ have different distances from Π, this
partition generation method simulates attacks on unlinkability of differ-
ent effectiveness.
Fig. 6: The behaviour of ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) with respect to the VOI metric.
The three plots in Figure 6 show how ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α) behaves as the
VOI distance between partitions over a set of n = 200 elements increases.
They demonstrate that the risk slope decreases monotonically as the VOI
distance between partitions increases. This matches our intuition that,
as the distance between the true partition and the adversary’s guess in-
creases, the average risk of reaching a particular threshold, also decreases.
Figure 6 (a) shows the effect of two selection methods for Π: the upper
graph shows the simulation results when Π is chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, and the lower graph shows the extreme case whereΠ is the singleton
partition. For both graphs, parameters were set to α = 0.75 and β = 0.80.
Figure 6 (b) demonstrates the influence of the policy parameter α. The
graphs show the cases for α = 1/4, 1/2, and 3/4, respectively. The under-
lying partition Π ′ was chosen uniformly at random and the threshold
parameter was fixed at β = 0.8. Note that, as α decreases, ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α)
decreases. As explained above, this is due to the conservative nature of
uniformly at random chosen partitions. Finally, Figure 6 (c) demonstrates
the effect of β. The graphs show the cases for β = 0.6, 0.8, and 0.95, re-
spectively. The underlying partition Π ′ was chosen uniformly at random
and the policy parameter was fixed at α = 3/4. The plot demonstrates the
intuitive result that, as β increases, the risk slope decreases.
6 Concluding remarks
We introduced a framework for the evaluation of adversarial partitions.
The framework is flexible because it enables the evaluator to attach dif-
ferent levels of importance to the adversary’s inability to link a given
subject’s elements, and its inability to distinguish the subject’s elements
from elements of other subjects. The evaluator may also specify, for each
subject, different sensitivities for each element in the system as well as a
threshold that represents what constitutes a privacy breach.
Our framework focuses on errors made by the adversary and distin-
guishes between primary and secondary errors. While primary errors mea-
sure how well a given subject’s elements are currently linked and mixed
with other subjects’ elements, secondary errors project the risk that the
adversary’s current state represents for the future. Underlying this risk
measurement is the implicit assumption that the adversary will obtain,
in this future, information that enables a gradual merging of the clusters
that contain some of that subject’s elements, without at the same time
filtering out foreign elements. In some settings, the adversary may be able
to obtain information that leads to different ways of refining its current
view. In such cases, secondary errors may turn out to be a less accurate
representation of the real risk. We believe that, nevertheless, this does not
invalidate the current approach because any refinement can be defined as
a set of cluster mergings and splittings: our linked graph accounts for the
mergings, and our mixed graph partially accounts for the splittings.
Our evaluation framework does not, however, fully account for the
number of splittings necessary to divide all elements into clusters. This
is because, while the mixed graph represents the number of foreign ele-
ments, it does not take into account the exact number of subjects that
correspond to these foreign elements. In some settings, for example [6],
this number, as well as the requirement that each other subject should be
represented by an approximately equal number of foreign elements, is im-
portant. Refining the evaluation framework in this respect while retaining
its intuitive and flexible nature, is future work.
We envision our measures to be used for the evaluation of attacks on
unlinkability in diverse settings including anonymous communication, on-
line anonymous transactions, and identity management. We expect them
to be useful because, by enabling the evaluator to play with the α and β
parameters on the subject level, they offer the ability to evaluate attacks
in more detail. Of course, in order to visualise and evaluate the adver-
sary’s state, this state must first be gathered. While this is typically not
a problem in experimental settings, doing this without turning the data
gatherer himself into the adversary remains a challenge in most real-world
settings. Sometimes, however, for example in the setting of database sani-
tisation, the adversary’s state is published. We expect our measures, just
like other privacy measures, to be useful in pre-deployment analysis and in
cases where reliable information about the adversary’s state is available.
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A Random partitions
This section experimentally examines how our measures behave for ran-
domly chosen adversarial partitions. This examination provides reference
points to attack evaluators which can be used to quantify by how much
an adversary outperforms random guessing. We perform two experiments
which we call the ‘uniform’ and the ‘non-uniform’ experiment, respec-
tively. In both experiments, Π and Π ′ are randomly generated from the
space of all set partitions of sets of size n. The experiments differ in the
way the partitions are drawn from the space. In the uniform experiment,
in particular, Π and Π ′ are chosen uniformly from the space of parti-
tions. In the non-uniform experiment, Π and Π ′ are generated as follows.
Initially, the to-be-generated partition consists of a ‘cluster population’
containing a single cluster that contains the first element. The remaining
n − 1 elements are then assigned to clusters, one by one, as follows. For
each element, a fair coin is tossed. In case of heads, a new cluster is cre-
ated, the element is assigned to that cluster, and the cluster is added to
the cluster population; otherwise, a cluster already in the population is
chosen uniformly at random and the element is assigned to it.
Fig. 7 shows some experiment results. As far as primary errors are
concerned, in the uniform experiment occur, on average, slightly more
errors than in the non-uniform experiment. Observe that, unless α takes
very high values, in both experiments there occur less include than miss
errors. For high values for α (say, above 90%), there occur more include
rather than miss errors. This is because foreign elements are largely disre-
garded when determining the most relevant cluster and, as a result, that
cluster has more foreign than correct elements. The average combined
normalised error counts reflect the fact that there occur slightly fewer
primary errors in the non-uniform than in the uniform experiment. Ob-
serve that, in our experiments, the choice of α has no significant impact
on this measure.
Fig. 7: First row: Average number of miss and include errors, i.e. m(Π,Π ′, α) and
i(Π,Π ′, α), for varying n. Second row: normalised combined error counts e∗(Π,Π ′, α)
on a logarithmic scale, for varying n. Third row: Risk slope ∆(Π,Π ′, 0.8, α) for
varying n. Fourth row: Risk slope ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α), for constant n = 50 and varying
threshold β. The results shown are for all parameter values α ∈ {0, 1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 1} and
contamination is assumed to be undesirable (b = 0). Plots on the left and right hand
side show results from the uniform and non-uniform experiment, respectively.
The value of α has, on the other hand, a significant impact on the risk
slopes ∆(Π,Π ′, β, α); higher values of α yield higher risk slopes. More-
over, in the uniform experiment, the difference between the risk slopes for
low and high values for α is much smaller than the corresponding differ-
ence in the non-uniform experiment. Finally, as the threshold β increases,
the risk slopes converge. In the uniform experiment they converge slowly;
in the non-uniform experiment they do not converge until β ≈ 0.7, but
then they converge fast.
